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POWER POLITICS 
Steve Martin 
A current important issue in environmental politics is nuclear power; 
and we in Scotland are as involved as any community in Britain. Scotland 
has three commercial electricity generating nuclear power stations run by 
the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB), two at Hunterston in 
Ayrshire and one at Torness in East Lothian; in addition the UK Atomic 
Energy Authority (UKAEA) also run the Dounreay fast reactor research 
establishment in Caithness, and British Nuclear Fuels pic (BNFL) operate 
the Chapelcross plutonium production reactors near Annan in the south-
west. In the past parts of Scotland have been earmarked as nuclear waste 
disposal sites, proposals which appear to be gaining currency again, and 
Orkney and Deeside have been suggested as possible uranium mining 
areas. 
This article will discuss the nuclear power debate in Scotland with 
particular reference to the waste dumping controversy, the Torness nuclear 
power station campaign and recent proposals for a new fast reactor 
reprocessing plant at Dounreay. These issues have all generated public 
resistance, and have contributed to the widely held opposition to nuclear 
developments in Scotland. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the nuclear debate there is no issue more likely to anger and activate 
people than nuclear waste. Local communities perceive proposals for a 
nuclear 'dump'- or indeed even vague and unsubstantiated rumours of one 
-as a violation of their environment; they imagine poisoned water, children 
dying of cancer, and a wholesale destruction of their life-style. Their first 
impulse is to say "No: we don't want your radioactive refuse dumped in our 
backyard." 
Once the initial emotions have subsided the threat of nuclear dumping 
serves to make people think. Ironically, the spokespeople from the nuclear 
industry who come to reassure the locals usually make matters worse. They 
claim that it is perfectly safe, and that nothing can go wrong. For many local 
people, this is the first time they have had to consider the nuclear industry. 
They gradually realise that nuclear dumping is but the final phase in a long 
process. They begin to question the whole process; they research and learn; 
they contact bodies for information. They become opposed to the whole 
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nuclear process, from uranium mmmg, through fuel production and 
generation, to reprocessing and waste disposal. They also make contacts 
with other communities facing the same threat. It is no longer "not in my 
backyard", it has become "nowhere at all". 
And what is it these people learn which makes them so against the 
nuclear industry? It is not so much what they learn as how they learn it. 
Official spokespeople are seen as trying to hide information. Circuitous 
routes have to be taken to achieve an overview. Information from the 
industry often conflicts with that from other agencies, whether they be anti-
nuclear groups or independent bodies. Opinion polls show that the public 
are likely to believe pressure groups before they believe government 
officials or nuclear industry spokespeople.<!) Therefore, information 
pieced together from various sources becomes more 'real' than that spoon-
fed from government officials. 
So what are the issues which make people so opposed to the nuclear 
power industry? In Scotland we have more than our share of the nuclear 
industry. The Hunterston nuclear power stations supplied 45% of Scottish 
electricity needs in 1986/7,(2) and Torness could increase this proportion to 
over 60%, making Scotland one of the most nuclear-dependent countries in 
the world. On top of this Scotland also plays host to the Dounreay fast 
reactor research establishment and the Chapelcross plutonium production 
reactors, and has been threatened in the past with uranium mining and 
nuclear waste disposal. And the nuclear dumping threat is about to rear its· 
ugly head again. 
TORNESS- THE BEGINNING OF NUCLEAR POLITICS 
Nuclear politics began in Scotland in 1974 with a public inquiry into the 
SSEB's plans to build a nuclear power station at Torness Point near Dunbar 
in East Lothian. The inquiry lasted nine days in June and July of 1974. The 
then East Lothian and Berwick County Councils objected on amenity 
grounds; local farmers, anglers and residents gave evidence against the 
plant; and Friends of the Earth and the Edinburgh branch of the 
Conservation Society led a comprehensive case on safety and energy 
policy. Torness was the first public inquiry at which any comprehensive 
case was delivered against an application to build a nuclear power station; 
since then there have been inquiries into nuclear dumping, the Sizewell B 
nuclear power station, the Windscale Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
(THORP), and the Dounreay European Demonstration Reprocessing 
Plant (EDRP). All of these inquiries lasted much longer than Torness -
ED RP and TH 0 RP lasted 95 and 100 days respectively, and Sizewelllasted 
over 2 years. 
At the inquiry the SSEB said they needed Torness to fulfil a future 
electricity demand, and it would be good value for money. Permission was 
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applied for to build up to eight reactors of any of four types. In his report of 
12 November 1974 the Reporter, Mr A G Bell, recommended permission 
be granted.f3l The go ahead was given in February 1975, by William Ross 
(the then Secretary of State for Scotland), to build a Steam Generating 
Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR), which was the reactor design then 
favoured by the Government. \4) 
According to the Scottish Economic Planning Department, if the 
SSEB wanted to build a different type of reactor it would be up to the 
Scottish Secretary to decide "what additional processes, if any should be 
put in hand to assist him to decide"<5l whether consent should be granted. In 
1978 the SSEB decided to build an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) 
at Torness because the SGHWR had fallen out of favour. Bruce Millan, the 
then Scottish Secretary gave the go ahead on 25 August 1978, without 
recourse to a further public inquiry. <6l 
Wide-scale opposition to the development grew. Thousands of people 
gathered at demonstrations at the site in 1978 and 1979, and a Systems 
Three Scotland opinion poll published in 1978 showed 42% of those 
questioned were against the plant. <7l A poll by the same company published 
in May 1987 showed 53% would like the project to be abandoned.<8l Over 
nine years, despite an enormous propaganda effort by the SSEB and the 
near completion of the plant, more people are against Torness than when 
the go ahead was given. 
The case against Torness is simple: there is no need for further 
electricity generating capacity in Scotland. At the 1974 inquiry the SSEB 
based their case on a 6% per annum compound growth in electricity 
demand until the end of the century; they expected demand to double by 
1985.<9l Demand in 1986n was 21,032 million units compared with 19,220 
million units in 1974- an increase of only 9.4% over 12 years. (IOl On top of 
which, the newest non-nuclear power station on the grid in Scotland, 
Inverkip oil-fired plant, "was placed on a care and maintenance regime 
from 1 April1987"< 11 l: that is 2,000MW of plant in 'mothballs' compares 
with only 1,400MW which Torness represents. The SSEB's forecast was 
therefore wildly inaccurate, optimistic and deceptive. 
Another way of looking at this argument is to consider the total 
generating capacity available on the grid. On 13 January 1987 there was a 
'simultaneous maximum demand' in the SSEB area of 5,111MW; at the 
time the power stations were able to send out about 7,500 MW, 47% more 
capacity than required on the coldest day. <12l Furthermore, since the time of 
the Torness inquiry the number of thermal power stations on the grid in 
Scotland has been reduced from 13 to 7, but the installed capacity has 
increased from about 6,000MW to 7, 700MW, thereby concentrating power 
production in a smaller number of larger stations with the consequent 
requirement for a large overcapacity to cope with plant which is closed for 
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repair etc. (13) 
An important consequence of concentrating electricity production in 
few, large, nuclear stations is the effect on employment. The nature of 
nuclear power stations means that they must be run continually as 'base 
load' supply. There are two reasons for this: first, the much larger capital 
versus fuel cost of a nuclear station requires constant use to recoup 
investment; and second, safety and efficiency may be compromised if the 
station is turned on and off to suit demand. Therefore, nuclear stations 
displace coal and oil stations from their previous role as base load capacity-
with Torness and the two Hunterston stations operating to full capacity 
almost two thirds of the winter peak demand can be met. The employment 
effect of nuclear generation is twofold: it is a highly capital intensive 
industry clearly shown by the 9.5% decrease in the number of SSEB 
employees over the last 10 years (from 13,632 in 1978 to 12,339 in 1987) 
compared with the 320% increase in fixed assets per employee over the 
same period (from £49,039 to £207 ,744)< 14l; and the knock-on effect on the 
coal and supply industries means that workers will be laid off as coal-fired 
stations and their associated pits have to close- bringing on Torness could 
mean up to 5,000 redundancies in the Lothians with the closure of 
Cockenzie and the Monktonhall and Bilston Glen pits. <15l 
Torness is planned to have a 30 year operating life, during which time it 
will generate electricity by 'burning' uranium fuel. Periodically spent fuel 
rods will be removed from the reactor and 2 or 3 'flasks', each containing 20 
spent fuel elements, will be sent to Sellafield by rail "not more than one 
train in any one week" for reprocessing. "The most probable route would 
be from Torness via Edinburgh-Carstairs-Carlisle to Sellafield, but other 
routes are available. "06l There is great concern among local authorities and 
the public about transport of nuclear materials through their communities, 
but the regulations covering such transports are Government policy and, as 
such, are not open for consideration at public inquiries. 
At the end of that time the station will have to be decommissioned. No 
realistic costs have ever been proposed for decommissioning; indeed the 
procedures and method have not yet been worked out, after 30 years of 
nuclear power generation in the UK. Estimates for costs vary, but could be 
as high as the construction cost of the station. <17l 
GOVERNMENT NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY CHANGES 
Government nuclear waste policy has been subjected to severe 
criticism, both from environmental groups and from government advisory 
bodies. The policy reflects political pressures rather than technical, 
scientific developments. When the nuclear industry began in Britain in the 
1950s no thought was apparently given to what would be done with the 
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site at Sellafield and Dounreay, and a national dump exists at Drigg in 
Cumbria. More bulky and longer-lived radioactive materials used to be 
dumped in the north Atlantic Ocean, 500 miles south west of Lands End, 
but this route was abandoned in 1983 because of industrial action by the 
National Union of Seamen and international pressure. 
Investigations began in the late 1970s to find a site for a deep 
depository for high level nuclear waste. This material is the concentrated 
liquid generated by reprocessing spent fuel. It is currently stored in steel-
lined tanks at Sellafield. Almost 1,500 cubic metres of this material is 
awaiting disposal, and it remains radioactive for thousands of years. <18l It is 
intended that this liquid will be vitrified - turned into glass - but a 
commercial scale plant has not yet been built. 
In February 1980 a public inquiry was held into an application by the 
UKAEA to carry out test drilling on Mullwharchar hill, in the Galloway 
Forest Park in south west Scotland, to discover if the rock was suitable for 
high level waste disposal. A further inquiry, looking at the Cheviots, took 
place later that year. Following great public opposition to the plans, and a 
report from their Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Commitee 
(RWMAC), the Government abandoned the high level waste programme 
in December 1981, and decided that the waste should be stored for 50 years 
before disposai.<19l However, Dr Stanley Bowie, a member of RWMAC 
and one of the country's leading nuclear geologists, resigned the following 
year because he believed the Government had taken the Committee's 
advice out of context: they had given in to political pressure.<20l A new 
disposal policy was announced in 1983: low and intermediate level wastes 
were to be disposed of on land. A deep anhydrite mine under Billingham in 
Cleveland, was proposed for intermediate level waste, and Elstow in 
Bedfordshire was proposed for low level waste. <21 ) Opposition groups were 
formed in the threatened areas. Billingham was abandoned in January 
1985; one reason given was that ICI (the mine's owners) had refused access 
to the survey team because of huge pressure from the local community.<22l 
Three further sites joined Elstow on the short list for a low level waste 
dump in February 1986 after a year of procrastination by the 
Government. <23l To avoid another embarrassing public inquiry, Special 
Development Orders were ~ranted in Parliament to permit survey 
engineers access to the sites. 24l Local opposition grew, the sites were 
blockaded, injunctions were served, objectors were arrested, mistrust 
developed. On 1 May 1987 the Government abandoned the sites in 
response to a letter from John Baker, the head of NIREX (the company 
responsible for nuclear waste management). Mr Baker suggested "a major 
change of approach." The low level sites should be abandoned and efforts 
should be concentrated "on the development of options for the deep 
disposal of intermediate level wastes with the additional intention to piggy-
back low level wastes in the same facility. "<25 l In response to the 
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announcement David Clark MP, Labour's environment spokesperson, 
described the decision as "a squalid attempt to save themselves from 
electoral embarrassment" because the areas included constituencies of 
three Government ministers and unpublished internal opinion polls 
showed Conservative support waning in the constituencies, and a general 
election was due. <26l 
Which brings the nuclear waste controversy back to Scotland. The 
merging of the intermediate and low level repository investigations gave 
cause for alarm to Scottish observers. During late 1987 rumours began to 
circulate among Scottish island communities. The islands of Jura, Raasay, 
Orkney and Shetland were the first to be suspected, although many more 
will follow. There is also suspicion that Mullwharchar may again become a 
possible site, along with an area of moorland in Caithness called Altnabreac 
which has already been surveyed as part of the 1970s high level programme. 
Anti-dumping groups have been formed in many parts of Scotland, and a 
national umbrella organisation - Scotland Against Nuclear Dumping 
(SAND) - was formed in June 1987. SAND will help to co-ordinate 
opposition to local dumping plans, will circulate information between 
gtoups, and will liaise with anti-dumping groups in England and Wales.<27l 
FAST REACTOR DEVELOPMENT 
During this period of nuclear waste policy changes, another nuclear 
initiative was being developed. In January 1984 Peter Walker, the then 
Secretary of State for Energy, signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding' 
with Energy Department representatives of Belgium, France, Italy and 
West Germany. This agreement marked Britain's entry into the European 
collaboration on fast reactor development. (2Bl 
The fast reactor is the 'philosopher's stone' of nuclear power 
enthusiasts; it is a reactor system which is theoretically capable of 
'breeding' its own fuel. The core of the fast reactor contains a fuel mixture 
of plutonium and uranium oxides, and is surrounded by a 'blanket' of 
'fertile' uranium which is not itself capable of sustaining a chain reaction but 
can 'capture' neutrons which escape from the core reaction; this converts 
the uranium into plutonium which can then be used as a fuel. An essential 
component of this reactor system is reprocessing- the unburnt plutonium 
and uranium from the core, and the bred plutonium from the blanket, must 
be chemically separated and recycled to meet a return on the vast capital 
investment required for the system. The declared advantage offast reactors 
over 'conventional' reactors is their ability to extract 60 times as much 
energy from a given amount of uranium by this breeding and reprocessing 
system. <29l 
To date more than £2,500 million has been spent on fast reactor 
research and development in this country, much of the work being carried 
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out at the UKAEA's Dounreay establishment near Thurso in Caithness. (30l 
The other European countries have also spent large sums on fast reactor 
research and development. The collaboration grew out of their objective to 
continue the fast reactor development but reduce the individual countries' 
financial commitment. Hence, the proposed programme is to include three 
full sized commercial demonstration reactors, a fuel fabrication plant and a 
reprocessing plant. However, because of the collaborative nature of the 
programme each of these plants could be in a different country. 
In May 1985 the Government announced their support for an 
application for outline planning permission by the UKAEA and BNFL to 
construct the reprocessing plant component of the collaboration - the 
European Demonstration Reprocessing Plant (EDRP).<3!l This plant was 
to take spent fuel from the three European collaborative reactors, 
reprocess it to extract the plutonium and uranium, and send those materials 
to the fuel fabrication plant. No decision has yet been taken as to where the 
reactors will be built, so until there is fuel to be reprocessed from them the 
Dounreay EDRP is proposed to reprocess spent fuel from the existing 
French Superphenix fast reactor, and the German Kalkar plant which is not 
yet operating. Highly radioactive plutonium spent fuel will therefore have 
to travel by sea and rail to Dounreay from up to 1,000 miles away; and pure 
plutonium oxide will be flown back to a fabrication plant whose site has not 
yet been decided. 
THE EDRP PUBLIC INQUIRY 
A public inquiry into the EDRP application began at Thurso on 7 
April, and ended on 19 November 1986. The terms of reference of the 
inquiry were seriously questioned before the inquiry opened, and many 
major objectors decided not to participate because of the restrictions 
imposed on what evidence could and could not be heard. <32l The form of 
inquiry - a public local planning inquiry under the Town and Country 
Planning (Scotland) Act 1972- meant that matters of Government policy 
could not be examined;<33l objectors had demanded a Planning Inquiry 
Commission which could have looked at all aspects of the application and 
which could have questioned government policy. Also, the Scottish 
Secretary refused to allow objectors to be financed from the public purse; 
the UKAEA/BNFL resources far outstripped those of the objectors, and 
they had access to public funding from the tax payer. 
The major issues which arose during the inquiry were: transport plans, 
plant safety and management, nuclear waste management, radioactive 
discharges, health effects, economic effects and the threat of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons materials. 
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Transportation 
The objectors argued Dounreay was the worst possible choice for a 
European reprocessing plant because of the distances involved in 
transportation - the greater the distances involved the greater the risk of 
accident or terrorist intervention. At the same time as dismissing such 
accusations, the Applicants would not openly discuss security 
arrangements for the transports, and the Reporter refused to accommodate 
detailed discussion of the links between nuclear weapons programmes and 
the fast reactor programme although the Applicants were allowed to say 
that fast reactor plutonium is not suitable for nuclear warheads. 
One aspect of transport which angered objectors was the Applicants 
refusal to specify which port they intended to use to bring the spent fuel into 
the country, and from which the spent fuel will be taken by rail to 
Dounreay. At a pre-inquiry meeting in December 1985 the Applicants 
agreed to supply a short list of possible ports. <34l At the time of the inquiry 
this list contained four ports, three on the Cromarty Firth and Scrabster 
near Dounreay. During the inquiry it transpired that they were still 
considering other ports, and in his Part 1 report on the inquiry the Reporter 
discounted the Cromarty Firth options because "there is no indication of 
any support from the (Cromarty Firth) port authority" narrowing down the 
options to "the use of Scrabster as the port of entry or the use of a link to the 
national rail network permitting access to a wider range of ports. "<35l In 
short, the Applicants are now free to choose any port, from the south coast 
of England to the north of Scotland, through which to bring in the spent fuel 
even though they were ordered to produce a short list for consideration at· 
the inquiry and the objectors could therefore only present evidence and 
cross examine on that basis. It means that, if the proposal goes ahead, spent 
fuel could now travel up the length of the country. 
Plant Safety and Management 
Safe operation of the proposed plant, and the management's ability to 
ensure such, was also a subject of criticism. The Applicants claimed the 
record of BNFL at Sellafield was irrelevant to the application, although 
there have been over 300 incidents there over the past 30 ~ears, and this 
application was jointly lodged by the UKAEA and BNFL. 36l BNFL were 
found guilty and fined £10,000 for four breaches of nuclear safe?; following 
discharge of a radioactive slick into the Irish Sea in 1983.0 l Also, an 
investigation by the Nil, following a spate of accidents in early 1986, gave 
BNFL 12 months to overhaul plant safety or face closure: a month after 
their report was published another incident, similar to the one which 
prompted the investigation, occurred- the plant is still operating. <38l 
The UKAEA's record at Dounreay is not as unblemished as they 
claim. In the run up to the EFRP inquiry the UKAEA were forced to 
release previously restricted minutes of the health and safety sub-
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throughput basis- 194 incidents occurred in 1984 alone.<39l Radioactive 
particles have been discovered on a beach near the plant, and 
contamination has been detected on buses used by workers which are also 
used by school children. 
Nuclear Waste Management 
Throughout the inquiry the Applicants, and Government policy 
witnesses, asserted that nuclear waste will be disposed of as according to 
government policy; for low level waste this meant in the shallow 
repositories proposed for the southern English sites. But, these sites have 
now been abandoned, so again the objectors found themselves arguing in 
an area which was subsequently changed. It was accepted by the Applicants 
that high level nuclear waste resulting from reprocessing overseas spent 
fuel will be stored at Dounreay pending construction of sites to take it. The 
logistical difficulties of transporting large volumes of low level wastes back 
to the country of origin, as is government policy, means that "it may be 
sensible to substitute an equivalent quantity, in radiological terms, of 
higher level waste" according to Mr Morphet of the Department of Energy 
- Britain will have to dispose of large volumes of low level European 
radioactive wastes as well as store high level wastes pending their return. (40l 
Radioactive Discharges 
Although the final design of EDRP is not yet certain it is clear it will 
incorporate the deliberate discharge, of low level liquid and gaseous 
wastes. These discharges will be "as low as reasonably achievable"; this 
does not mean that they will be safe. Considerable concern was expressed 
by the objectors about levels of discharge, and their effects on fishing, 
farming and tourist industries. Local produce could be 'tainted' in the 
public mind by the mere threat of discharges. <41 l 
The annual discharges will be about the same as from the French Cap 
de Ia Hague reprocessing plant which is a large commercial plant with a 
much greater throughput. It is clearly unsatisfactory that a demonstration 
plant not expected to be operational for over 10 years will discharge almost 
as much as an existing French commercial scale plant. <42l There are no 
proposals for the capture of krypton-85 gas, despite a greater amount of its 
discharge from EDRP than from the existing plant at Dounreay and Mr 
Justice Parker's (the Inspector at the 1977 Windscale Inquiry) comments 
that he was "satisfied" that krypton removal plant should be incorporated 
intoTHORP.<43l 
Health Effects 
A special 13 day session was set aside at the inquiry to consider 
evidence on the health effects of radioactive discharges. The basis of 
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medical evidence from the Thurso area was a study prepared by Dr 
Heasman, a medical statistician with the Scottish Health Service, which 
showed an increased incidence of leukaemia in the 0-24 age group within 
12.5km of Dounreay between 1979 and 1984. <44l When asked his opinion on 
the possibility of the increased leukaemia incidence occurring by chance, 
Dr Heasman replied: "It is more likely to have had some other cause. "<45 l 
This led him to conclude that some causal connection must exist, and 
Dounreay should not be excluded as the cause - a possibility strengthened 
by similar evidence which exists around Sellafield and other nuclear 
establishments. 
In the conclusions to his Part 1 Report, Mr Bell turned this evidence on 
its head and declared: "the cluster identified within 2.5km of Dounreay in 
1979/84 could have emerged by chance."<46l However, because of the 
continuing debate over whether or not a link between nuclear plants and 
leukaemia exist, he accepted that further work, including case studies, 
needs to be carried out. The unresolved nature of the controversy was 
highlighted by Andrew Hardie QC, the independent Counsel to the 
inquiry. He argued that a decision on the application should be postponed 
until the Committee on the Medical Aspects of Radiation in the 
Environment (CO MARE) had published their major report providing new 
evidence on the Dounreay leukaemias. <47l 
Economic Effects 
No study of the socio-economic effects of the EDRP proposal have 
been made. The Applicants stated that between 600 and 800 jobs will be 
created during the construction phase, but labour required for operation 
will be redeployed from the existing workforce. The estimated cost of £200 
million, about £250,000 for each temporary job, could be used more 
productively to create permanent jobs in the local area. For example, the 
tourist industry has below average costs ~er now job generated, is largely 
labour intensive and can expand rapidly. 48l It is important to study the lost 
opportunity cost of EDRP in terms of what effect the injection of a similar 
amount of capital into the tourist industry would have. As EDRP is to be 
funded from the money markets, with the Government underwriting the 
borrowing, there is no reason why the Government should not be willing to 
extend the same facility to some other agency. The alternative of funding 
other energy projects should also be examined, both in terms of return of 
capital and employment potential. Scotland, and particularly the far north, 
is well suited for the development of renewable energy technologies. Such 
an examination would be in the public interest. 
It is also important to note that the usual practice in such projects is to 
import construction labour. A study for Gwynedd County Council, which 
covers an area containing two nuclear power stations, showed that 
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was no work for those workers who chose to stay in the area. <
49
) The Council 
concluded that major construction schemes help prevent the growth of 
employment in more stable industries as a result of their impact on local 
wage levels and labour supply. Short term advantages need to be set against 
long term disadvantages. 
As mentioned above, EDRP is but one component of a European 
collaborative venture, and until the collaborative reactors are operating it 
will be reprocessing fuel from the French and German fast reactors. The 
Applicants stressed the urgency of receiving outline approval for EDRP at 
this stage to allow them a bargaining counter in negotiations with the 
French who are also interested in building the plant. (SO) 
However, Superphenix, their reactor, is currently out of operation 
because of persistent leaks from its sodium secondary circuit; a problem 
which the French nuclear industry regard as presenting serious doubts for 
the future of the fast reactor programme. German involvement in the 
programme is also in doubt as their Kalkar reactor project is stricken with 
local political problems. After Chernobyl the Italian commitment to the 
collaboration wavered significantly when ENEL (their electricity utilitr,~ 
voted to withdraw from Europe's second fast reactor project.< 
1 
Confidential documents leaked from the UKAEA in 1987 indicate that 
their is little support in this country for the fast reactor, and the countries in 
the collaboration are unable to agree on how the programme should 
proceed<52l - the whole venture could still fail; at any rate, the urgency 
implied by the Applicants is now retreating rapidly into the distance. 
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 
As described above, the purpose of EDRP is to separate plutonium 
from spent fuel for future use as fast reactor fuel, but there is no technical 
reason why it could not find its way into nuclear warheads. In 1978 General 
Jean Thiry, an adviser to the managing director of the CEA (the French 
Atomic Energy Authority), wrote: 
"France will be able to build atomic weapons of all kinds and within 
every type of range. At relatively low cost, she will be in a position to 
produce large quantities of such weapons, with fast breeders 
providing an abundant supply of the plutonium required. "(
53
) 
France has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
although they have said that they will act as though they are a party to it. It is 
surely inappropriate for France to be bidding for a central role in a nuclear 
trading system whilst remaining outside the NPT and other multilateral 
control treaties. Britain should be urging France to sign the NPT, not aiding 
and abetting their nuclear ambitions. 
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Past British statements and practices also cast doubt on the uniquely 
civil role of EDRP. At the Sizewell inquiry every effort was made to 
convince the public that no plutonium from CEGB reactors had been 
diverted to military uses. (S4) Three years later Lord Marshall, the CEGB 
Chairman, admitted plutonium had indeed been moved from civil to 
military stockpiles. <55) The CEGB were prepared to deliberately and 
grossly mislead a public inquiry on a point which was absolutely crucial to 
the debate. It is well known that BNFL practice "co-processing" at 
Sellafield - spent fuel from civil and military reactors is reprocessed 
together. The definition of civil or military material is also confused. One 
might reasonably expect that military plutonium comes from a military 
reactor, and civil plutonium from a civil one; but BNFL define the material 
by final destination not source. <56) So, if high purity (weapons-grade) 
plutonium comes from the co-processing it is classified as military material, 
whereas impure plutonium is called "civil". BNFL's contention that civil 
plutonium is not used in warheads can only be justified by this sleight of 
hand. 
There is a great grassroots feeling in Scotland against nuclear weapons, 
so the proposal to build a reprocessing plant capable of providing material 
for not only British, but also French nuclear weapons, has been greeted 
with condemnation. There is nothing in the Applicants' case, or official 
statements, which gives absolute confidence that plutonium will not find its 
way into nuclear warheads; in fact there is good reason to suspect that it 
will. 
POLITICAL RESPONSES 
At the 1987 General Election the great majority of Scottish voters cast 
their ballot in favour of Parties against further nuclear expansion, but the 
elected British Government is fully committed to the expansion of the 
nuclear industry. The abandonment of English dump sites, the expanding 
reactor programme announced by the Central Electricity Generating 
Board, and rumours of nuclear dump sites all suggest that Scotland could be 
earmarked for further nuclear developments. 
Scotland has been threatened by the nuclear industry in its many guises 
over the past decade, and people have learnt to be suspicious. At the time 
of the Torness inquiry there was little opposition to nuclear power, but as 
the campaign has developed a small group of protestors has become the 
majority. This popular opposition to nuclear power now has the support of 
political parties, trade unions, and local authorities. The Scottish National 
Party and the Liberals have been against nuclear power for a long time, and 
were joined by the Labour Party in 1986 following a successful anti-nuclear 
motion at their Conference. <57) At their 1987 Congress the Scottish TUC 
passed a motion calling for a moratorium on further nuclear stations,<58l 
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currently reviewing the whole question of nuclear power. (S9) Local 
authorities are now opposing Torness, Dounreay and proposed nuclear 
dumping; the Nuclear Free Zones Scotland Steering Committee have spent 
a lot of time researching and discussing these issues, and they have 
produced a booklet and other material on the EDRP proposal. There is no 
doubt that any future nuclear plans will be met with a strong and united 
opposition. 
Steve Martin, Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace, 
Edinburgh. 
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